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Changes of Ownership and Identities of Malaysian Banks:  
Ethnicity, State and Globalization  
 
This article analyses the changes of ownership and identities of Malaysia’s locally-
owned banks in a series of merger and acquisitions (M&A) within national border and 
beyond. The article begins with description of the establishments of local banks in 
Malaya and later Malaysia which were mainly founded and owned by ethnic Chinese. 
The author then examines how the internal factors (protracted affirmative action policy 
and the consolidations of local banks by the state) and external factors (forces of 
globalization) had changed Malaysia’s local banks from mainly Chinese-owned to 
state-owned and from medium-size domestically-based to large-scale regionally-based 
banking groups. The author shows how the internal factors have been shaping the 
ownership and identity of Malaysian banks, which aim to facilitate the formation of a 
Malay entrepreneurial class. The author also show how the external factors have been 
shaping the strategies and size of the Malaysian banking groups to become huge 
regional banks to compete with foreign banks for sizable and value deals in the region, 
in the context of greater liberalization of the financial sector.  
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Introduction 
Most domestic banks established in Malaysia were mainly owned and identified with the 
Chinese Community. Chinese family-owned banks developed and flourished in the 1960s and 
play significant roles in funding the development of Chinese businesses and for nation 
building. Out of the 23 commercial banks in Malaysia, 14 were established by the Malaysian 
Chinese (Cheah 2011). Until the 1970s, ‘all of Malaysia’s local banks (with two or three 
exceptions) were synonymous with Chinese business’ (Hara 1991: 350). During these 
periods, the presence of many small banks, predominantly Chinese family-owned, and other 
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retail enterprises gave an impression that the Chinese was dominating the Malaysian 
economy. In actual sense, as of 1970, Chinese ownership of the Malaysian banking sector 
was 24.3 per cent, which was far higher than the Malays (3.3%) but much less than the 
foreigners (52.2%) (Malaysia 1973: 83).  
It was widely argued that the uneven distribution of wealth among different ethnic 
groups in Malaysia, largely between ethnic Chinese and ethnic Malays was blamed as the 
principal factor that led to the communal riot in May 1969. Following this tragedy, a 
redistributive policy, dubbed the New Economic Policy (NEP) was introduced with two 
prong strategies, to eliminate poverty and to restructure the Malaysian society in a timeframe 
of two decades (1971-1990). The second prong of the NEP’s spirit has great and lasting 
impacts on Malaysia’s banking sector, especially in the context of increased economic 
globalization which see rapid changes of ownership and identities in Malaysia’s local banks.  
This article analyses the changes of ownership and identities of Malaysia’s locally-
owned banks from mainly Chinese-owned to state-owned and from medium-size 
domestically-based to large-scale regionally-based banking groups. These changes come 
about through a series of merger and acquisitions (M&A) within national border and beyond. 
It examines how the internal and external factors had contributed to the M&A of Malaysia’s 
local banks. For internal factors, the state’s bank consolidation policies are strategies aim at 
facilitating the formation of a Malay entrepreneurial class or a Bumiputera Commercial and 
Industrial Community (BCIC). As for external factors, the state’s bank consolidation policies 
are strategies to create large Malaysian banking groups to compete with foreign banks in the 
context of greater liberalization in the domestic financial sector and beyond. 
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Changes in Ownership and Identities of Malaysia’s Local Banks 
This section provides information of the establishments, ownership, identities and functions 
of Malaysia’s local banks and shows the evolution of these banks in terms of ownership and 
identities.  
Early local banks established in Malaya were generally Chinese clan-based. These 
banks were established to meet the needs of small Chinese traders. The earliest bank 
incorporated in Malaya was Kwong Yik (Selangor) Bank (1913) which founded by 
prominent Cantonese businessmen aims to help, mainly the Cantonese community (Tan 
1961: 455). In 1920, Batu Pahat Bank Ltd was established in Batu Pahat, Johor by the 
Hokkien. In 1935, Ban Hin Lee Bank Ltd (BHL) was established by a prominent Hokkien, 
the late Yeap Chor Ee in Penang (Tan 1953). BHL originally focused on serving local 
businessmen in their trading and merchant activities. In the 1960's, BHL branched into real 
estate and house financing throughout Malaysia and Singapore. The Bank of Malaya that 
emerged out of mining activities in Ipoh closed down in 1930 due to capital inefficiency and 
collapse of tin prices brought by the Great Depression (Tan 1961, Yen 2008). Banking was 
one of the manifestations of Chinese dialect identity and competition in economic life. They 
were an Indian-owned bank, Oriental Bank of Malaya, established in 1936. The main 
function of this bank was limited to handling remittances from the members of the Ceylonese 
community working in Malaya. They was also a Malay-owned bank, Malay National 
Banking Corporation, established in 1947 that undertook hire purchase business in sewing 
machines, motor vehicles, sarongs and musical instruments. But it failed in 1952 due to lack 
of banking experience of its directors and staff and its small capital (Lim 1967).  
In Sarawak, a few Chinese banks were established. All of these banks were traditional 
in their style of management and conservative in operation, being concerned with meeting the 
needs of local business groups rather than getting involved in international trading, 
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particularly with the West (Tan 1982). For instant, Bian Chiang Bank was established in 
Kuching by a Hokkien prominent businessman, Wee Kheng Chiang in 1924. In its early days, 
the Bian Chiang Bank’s1 activities were mainly related to business financing and the issuance 
of bills of exchange to the Chinese business community in Sarawak. Kwong Lee Bank, a 
Cantonese-owned bank started operation in 1905 in Kuching, Sarawak under the name of 
Kwong Lee Mortgage & Remittance Company. The company granted loans against the 
security of export commodities such as pepper, rubber and other indigenous products. It also 
provided the services of remitting money of overseas Chinese to their families in Southeast 
region of China. It later incorporated as Kwong Lee Bank Ltd in 1934. Another bank, Wah 
Tat Bank was established in 1955 was owned by two most prominent Hokkien families. 
Whilst, Hock Hua Bank established in 1952 represented the interest of the Foochow people 
that emerged as a joint venture of several Foochow entrepreneurs and a large number of small 
investors to provide loans to the Foochow farmers and traders that were refused by the 
Kwong Lee Bank and Wah Tat Bank (Ngu 2012). These largely dialect-based banks were 
small and accounted for only a third of the total deposits in Malaya and Borneo in 1955; the 
rest was held by the British owned Chartered Bank, Hong Kong and Shanghai Bank, and the 
Mercantile Bank (Supriyah 1984: 31). These family-owned, Sarawak-based banks are 
conservative in their management and reluctant to expand beyond the state for fear of dilution 
of their interests (Chen 2013) that eventually restrict their growth and size then became 
targets of acquisitions. Table 1 below provides a summary of the establishments of these 
early banks in Malaya.  
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Table 1: Early Banks (Locally incorporated) 
 
Name of Bank Places and year of incorporation  Ethnic/dialect affiliation 
 
Kwong Yik (Selangor) Bank Kuala Lumpur, 1913 Chinese-Cantonese 
Bank of Malaya* Ipoh, 1920 Chinese-Cantonese 
Batu Pahat Bank  Batu Pahat, 1920 Chinese-Hokkien 
Kwong Lee Bank** Kuching, Sarawak, 1934 (1905)  Chinese-Cantonese 
Bian Chiang Bank*** Kuching, Sarawak, 1956 (1924) Chinese-Hokkien 
Ban Hin Lee Bank Penang, 1935 Chinese-Hokkien 
Oriental Bank of Malaya Kuala Lumpur, 1936 Indian 
Malay National Banking Corporation Ltd**** Kuala Lumpur, 1947 Malay 
Hock Hua Bank Sibu, Sarawak, 1951 Chinese-Foochow 
Wah Tat Bank Sibu, Sarawak, 1955 Chinese-Hokkien 
      * 
Bank of Malaya operated from 1920-1930. 
   **
 Started as Kwong Lee Mortgage and Remittance Company in 1905. 
 ***
 On 24 December 1956 Bian Chinag Bank was incorporated under the name of Bian Chiang Bank Ltd. 
**** Malay National Bank operated from 1947-1952. 
Source: Compiled from Tan (1953), Lim (1967), Lee (1990) and Cheah (2011). 
 
The 1960s was an era of proliferation of family or Chinese-owned banks but also 
witnessed the emergence of ‘national banks’, which include shareholders of different ethnic 
group in Chinese-controlled banks and the establishment of a state-owned banks. Chinese 
businessmen who made their fortunes in the rubber and tin industries diversified into the 
financial sector and facilitate the industrial and property development activities (Tan 
1982:159). At that time, with a Chinese Finance Minister, it was not difficult for the Chinese 
to obtain a banking license. Several Chinese banks were incorporated such as the United 
Malayan Banking Corporation (1960), Malayan Banking (1960), Hock Hua Bank (1961) in 
Sabah, Southern Bank (1962), Development and Commercial Banking (1965), Kong Ming 
Bank (1965) and Public Bank (1966) (Hara 1991; Tan 1982). As the banking industry 
expended in the 1960s, they were some merger and acquisitions. In 1964, OCBC Bank of 
Singapore acquired a 52% majority stake in Kwong Lee Bank.  
As economic development moved on a faster pace and with greater intensity, and on a 
much broader economic base, dialect, clan and other traditional Chinese characteristics began 
to give way in the 1960s. During this period, spatial and occupational mobility became more 
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common, and greater integration occurred among Chinese through inter-marriage between 
different dialect/clan groups marked the beginning of the diminishing influence of 
dialect/clan relationship.  
Two ‘national’ and ‘multi-ethnic’ banks emerged in the 1960s; there were Malayan 
Banking Bhd. (MBB) and United Malayan Banking Corporation (UMBC). MBB was 
founded by Khoo Teik Puat and UMBC by Chang Min Thien. However, these banks did not 
have the baggage and liabilities of the old breed banks. Within the Chinese community, they 
were not dialect-based, and were not identified with any particular clans. They were 
considered ‘multi-ethnic’ banks in terms of ownership as well as the customer base. A 
government-owned bank, the Bank Bumiputra Malaysia Bhd. (BBMB) was incorporated in 
1965 as the first Malay commercial bank. Given the weak economic position of the Malays 
and that Chinese-owned banks were exclusive, the establishment of BBMB was to break the 
Chinese dominance in the banking industry and also aims to increase capital loan facility to 
Bumiputera individuals and companies (Snodgrass 1980: 53) as ways to advance a 
Bumiputera entrepreneurial class. 
To achieve the nation’s wealth retributive policy, the NEP has systematically shaping 
the country’s banking sector. Malaysia’s banking policies and reform of the banking sector 
has been an integral part of the NEP, which is a vibrant strategy to achieve the NEP’s second 
prong, to restructure the Malaysian societies, in terms of wealth distribution.  
To further achieve the NEP’s social-engineering of a Malay entrepreneurial class or a 
BCIC, Bank Negara, the central bank had in December 1966, seized opportunity and took 
controlled of MBB when it was faced with management problems and in danger of collapse. 
MBB was eventually put under government protection (Ranjit 1987), wherein, the central 
bank had used its discretionary power to take control of a bank. MBB is remained state-
owned until today. MBB was Malaysia’s largest bank and the Malaysian Chinese had not 
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only lost control of the largest local bank but also the identity of the bank identical to the 
Chinese community. Today, MBB or Maybank doesn’t carry any Chinese identity. In the 
present day, within the country, Malaysians perceived Maybank, the nation’s largest bank as 
state-owned or government-link company (GLC) and a Malay-controlled bank.  
Following the central bank’s takeover of MBB, the Bumiputera capital ownership, 
including trust agencies collectively owned 60.0 per cent of overall equity share in the 
domestic banking and finance companies by 1980. This figure had increased to 69.0 per cent 
in June 1985 (Malaysia 1986: 110). In a study by Fujio Hara (1991: 353) shows that 
Bumiputera ownership had increased to 77.0 per cent for the whole Malaysian banking 
industry by early 1982. The Chinese had lost for permanently, many of Chinese-controlled 
banks and banking identity synonymous to the Chinese community.  
The 1970s and late 1980s debt crisis and financial sector liberalization pushed the 
Malaysian banking institutions through a consolidation process to meet the requirements of 
the central bank which aimed to improve the banking industry’s competitiveness and 
encouraging the emergence of more professional management through the dilution of 
individual ownership. The central bank’s view was that small Malaysia banks would not be 
able to survive once the financial market was liberalized following the commitment under the 
General Agreement on Trade in Service (GATS) in the WTO (Jayasankaran 1997). This 
periods mark the beginning of the disappearance of some Chinese dialect banks.  
As of 1990, only eight of the 14 Chinese-controlled banks were left, six Chinese-
controlled banks had been taken over by the state or for Bumiputera interest (Hara 1991). 
Chinese ownership of Malaysia’s banking sector has declined from 24.3 percent in 1970 to 
10.2 percent in 2004 (Malaysia 1973: 83; Malaysia 2006: 338, 357). Simultaneously, more 
and larger state-owned and Malay-controlled banks are expanding their present in the 
domestic markets and beyond. 
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Strong loan growth prior to 1997 had led to high loan exposure of the banking system. 
As a result of the property market crash and substantial capital outflows, nonperforming loans 
(NPLs) in the banking system began to escalate, resulting in the deterioration in quality of the 
asset portfolio of the banking institutions. Banking institutions became reluctant to lend, 
coupled with higher interest rates, this resulted in a credit squeeze in financing for individuals 
and businesses. Against the backdrop of the Asian financial crisis in 1997, many Asian 
countries have undergone massive reforms in their financial sector. This external financial 
shock affected Indonesia, Thailand, Malaysia, and the Philippines. Each country adopted a 
push for local bank consolidation. To enhance competitiveness, the Malaysian government 
pressed on with liberalization by getting local banking groups to consolidate among 
themselves, rationalize common functions and operations across institutions, and outsource 
non-core activities. Among the four countries, Malaysia took the strongest state-guided 
approach and entirely reformed the domestic banking sector in the post Asian financial crisis 
year. To defend the affirmative action or redistributive policy and external shocks, the state 
adopted a gradualist approach towards financial liberalization (BNM 1999). Beck and Levine 
(2004) argue, when global trade has become more integrated, financial sector becomes more 
globalized and exposed to external shocks, states will likely to adopt proactive policies in the 
financial sector that could generate growth through mobilizing of resources towards more 
efficient use. For Malaysia, Cook (2008: 67) contends that before, during and after the Asian 
financial crisis, the Malaysian government took a very concerted defensive approach to the 
forces of banking sector globalization, state and state-affiliated banks remained the 
government’s favour. Cook argues that Malaysia’s statist-nationalist banking policy remain 
steadfast and was the most resilient to pressure of globalization, and protected until the 
present day. Such policy has resulted in the increased size of state-owned banks through 
M&A, and decreased in ethnic and family-owned small and medium-size banks. 
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The end result is the formation of ten anchor banks from a total of 54 financial 
institutions as at end of 2001. The aim then was to streamline the banking industry to 
withstand competition from large foreign banks in the process of liberalizing the domestic 
financial sector. In this context, small Chinese-controlled banks were absorbed into bigger 
banks and vanished from the corporate scene. The ten anchor banks are Malayan Banking, 
Bumiputra-Commerce Bank, Public Bank, RHB Bank, Arab-Malaysian Bank, EON Bank, 
Multi-Purpose Bank, Hong Leong Bank, Affin Bank, and Southern Bank. Under the 
government-initiated banking consolidation plan, on 1 July 2000 resulted in an entire reform 
in the Malaysian banking sector. Cook (2008) noted that since the late 1960s until the 
present, the government had been very firm with its state-guided approach and had 
systematically reformed the domestic banking sector. As of today, they are only two Chinese-
controlled or family-owned banks left in Malaysia namely, Public Bank and Hong Leong 
Bank. 
Nonetheless, Randhawa (2011: 410) contends that Malaysia’s banking reform 
currently consists of nine domestic anchor banks (after the acquisition of Southern Bank by 
Bumiputra-Commerce Bank in 2006) are consider too many which are not competitive 
enough compared to foreign banks. Randhawa further argues that the merger of commercial 
banks with investment banks and finance companies did not achieve the desired economies of 
scope and scale. In mid-2014, an exercise of forming Malaysia’s mega bank and reduce the 
current nine to eight anchor banks was inline with Randhawa’s argument. The 2014 attempt 
led by CIMB Group Holdings Bhd. (CIMB), Malaysia’s second-biggest bank to merge with 
RHB Capital Bhd. and Malaysia Building Society Bhd. (MBSB) to create Malaysia’s largest 
bank by assets of RM629 billion would surpass Malaysia’s largest lender, Malayan Banking 
Bhd.’s RM583.4 billion by assets (Bloomberg 10 October 2014). This new development 
indicates a trend toward fewer and larger banks in Malaysia. It also means that Chinese or 
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family-owned banks will further reduce from the current two to one and is likely completely 
vanished from Malaysia’s banking sector. On the other hand, given the history of CIMB 
(controlled by UMNO politicians) and RHB (controlled by well-connected businessmen), 
that struggle for control over Malaysia’s financial sector, political observers perceived “this 
consolidation will tightly entwine the interests of political and business elites in the banking 
sector” (KiniBiz 22 July 2014). 
 The 1980s and 1990s external shocks clearly show the increased of global forces and 
growing pressure on Malaysia’s financial sector reform which is shaping Malaysia’ banks 
ownership and identities. These two external shocks revealed that the government has a 
strong hand that favoured state and Bumiputera interests in the domestic banking sector. The 
state’s policy was seen as driven by the market forces of globalization but had never lose 
sight of the NEP’s redistributive policy. However, the 2008-09 global economic crisis 
witnessed a different form and scale of acquisitions by Malaysian banks, which were driven 
by market forces and they were mostly cross-border acquisitions. These took place before, 
during and throughout the protracted crisis periods. During these periods, the acquisitions by 
Malaysian banks involved not only banks in the ASEAN region but also Western investment 
banks in the Asia Pacific region when the West was going through a difficult time. Asian 
lenders, include Malaysian banks perceived the 2008 global economic crisis as a global 
economic power shifts to the region, and they seize opportunities to capture strategic and 
valuable deals.  
The following section of the article provides analysis of Malaysia’s five largest banks 
that describe through M&A and the state’s banking consolidation policies have shape the 
ownership and idenities of Malaysia’s local banks. Three of the state-owned and Bumiputera-
controlled banks have deep Chinese root and tradition in terms of strong banking foundation. 
These three state-owned banks are growing in size and expanded their presence in ASEAN 
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markets and beyond, which is becoming the ‘too big to fail banks’. The two Chinese-owned 
local banks are also growing in size and increased their cross-border banking activities 
through the acquisitions of foreign banks in connected markets but are not aggressive 
compared to state-owned banks. However, shareholdings of Chinese-ownership in the 
remainaing two Chinese-controlled banks have been reduced significantly. With the 
government’s policy to promote modern domestic commercial banking, the remnant of these 
two Chinese-controlled banks are the last targets of acquisitions by the state in the context of 
greater globalization of the domestic financial sector. Cheah (2011) noted that Chinese-
owned banks had emerged as the new breed of ‘national’ banks.   
 
Malayan Banking Group 
Malayan Banking Berhad or Maybank is Malaysia’s largest, among Asia’s leading financial 
services groups, and the fourth largest banking group in Southeast Asia by assets (RM650.4 
billion as of December 2013). It has relatively shorter Chinese root and tradition compared to 
the CIMB Group and RHB Group, which will be elaborate below. Maybank was founded by 
Khoo Teck Puat in 1960 shortly after he left the Oversea-Chinese Banking Corporation 
(OCBC) group in Singapore.  Khoo was a prominent businessman, his father owned stakes in 
the OCBC. Khoo controlled the Goodwood group of hotels and held significant stakes in the 
London-based Standard Chartered Bank. He established Maybank with 80 former OCBC 
staff and within six years, Maybank had opened more than 100 branches in Malaya, 
Singapore, London and Hong Kong. In 1963 Khoo as managing director and chief executive 
of Maybank financed his property investments, which include Goodwood Park Hotel for 
S$4.8 million. On this impropriety, Khoo lost his position as managing director of Maybank. 
In December 1969, the Malaysian Central Bank then effectively took control of Maybank 
(Ranjit 1987). 
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In the course of the post Asian financial crisis and state directed banking 
consolidation, Pacific Bank and Phileo-Allied Bank (PAB) were merged with Maybank in 
2001. Pacific Bank Berhad was incorporated as a wholly owned subsidiary of the Overseas 
Chinese Banking Corporation in 1963 after OCBC
2
 acquired the Bank of Batu Pahat Limited 
which was established in 1920. PAB was founded in 1995 by Tong Kooi Ong and has 
shareholders of different ethnic group with Avenue Assets Berhad (formerly known as Phileo 
Land Berhad) owned 18.52 per cent of PAB. Avenue Assets Berhad is a diversified 
conglomerate controlled by Mokhzani Mahathir, son of former Malaysian Prime Minister 
Mahathir Mohamad (Phileo-Allied Group Annual Report 2000: 95; FinanceAsia 14 July 
2000). Some analysts view that Tong secured a banking licence to establish PAB because he 
was linked to Anwar Ibrahim, then finance minister. The forced selling of PAB was in the 
context of after Anwar’s fall from power, and the banking consolidation initiative in the 
immediate post-Asian financial crisis. Tong was the first to develop online banking through 
the PAB. Recently, Tong in his own blog said that: 
 
“In 1995 when Phileo-Allied Bank introduced online banking and stockbroking, the 
Kuala Lumpur Stock Exchange tried to stop this innovation by going to the courts. The 
reason was to protect their market share and commission rates. And after the successful 
launch of OneAccount in 1996, the first current account that pays fixed deposit interest 
rates, Bank Negara stopped the launch of the OneCorporate account that would have 
given companies the same benefit. A few large banks protested. In the name of 
consolidation of the banking sector, an innovative, technologically superior and 
profitable bank was forced to be sold in 2001” (Tong 2013). 
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Since the central bank took control of Maybank in 1966, it remains a state-owned 
bank until today. As of end 2013 majority Bumiputera ownership in Maybank managed by 
Permodalan Nasional Berhad (PNB) alone was 46.05 per cent. PNB is a government 
investment fund established in 1978 as a principal vehicle of the government to achieve the 
NEP’s objective of societal restructuring by promoting share ownership in the corporate 
sector among the Bumiputera. PNB is today Malaysia’s largest fund management company 
by assets.  
Maybank has created for itself a new brand across Asia and beyond. It launched a new 
brand campaign in 2014 with the theme ‘Bridging Worlds in Asia’ in the competitive banking 
landscape in Asia. Maybank was already a regional bank in 1960 when it was established in 
Malaysia. Today with more than 2,200 offices in 20 countries, it connects many, in terms of 
financial needs across Asia. The Maybank brand name presence in all 10 countries in 
ASEAN, the three global financial centres of Hong Kong, London and New York, the two 
biggest emerging markets of China and India, the Middle East, and other countries.  
Maybank has been on an accelerated track of acquisition since the mid-1990s buying 
stakes in other banks of different regions to stay competitive as the financial sector is 
increasingly globalized. Maybank has a strong presence in Indonesia, Singapore and the 
Philippines. Maybank has its presence in Singapore since the year when it was incorporated 
in 1960. As at December 2013, Maybank's total assets in Singapore were S$42 billion. In 
2011 Maybank strengthens its securities business by acquiring Singapore brokerage Kim Eng 
Holdings Limited adding a new entity to its Malaysian investment banking operation, 
Maybank Investment Bank Berhad. The acquisition of Kim Eng gives Maybank an instant 
access to investment operations in Singapore, Thailand, Vietnam, Indonesia and the 
Philippines. Maybank perceived Kim Eng as a perfect complement to Maybank’ existing 
strengths in investment banking and the equities market to transform Maybank into a regional 
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powerhouse (Financial Times 6 June 2011). Now the Maybank Kim Eng Group has offices 
across Southeast Asia, the U.S. and U.K. It has been involved in several high-profile deals in 
the region.  
The Maybank brand entered the Indonesian market since 1995 when it entered a joint-
venture with PT Bank Nusa Nasional. Maybank gains greater visibility in Indonesia after its 
acquisition of PT Bank International Indonesia (BII) from Temasek (Singapore's state-owned 
investment company) and Kookmin (South Korea's biggest bank) who jointly hold a 
controlling interest of about 55.6 percent. Subsequently, Maybank owns 97.5% of BII in a 
deal amounted to USD2.7 billion. The acquisition took place when global bank stocks have 
plummeted 33 percent in 2008 (Bloomberg 30 September 2008). Its present in the Philippines 
started in 1997 after it acquired PNB Republic Bank in 1997 and renamed the bank as 
Maybank Philippines Inc. (MPI). Maybank as a financial group is growing in size, increase 
its presence in the region and beyond that has some similar development strategies like the 
CIMB Banking Group and RHB Banking Group which have rapidly expanding their 
international investment banking operations. 
 
CIMB Bank Group 
CIMB Bank Group is Malaysia’s second largest bank, the largest Asia Pacific investment 
bank (exclude Japan), and is the fifth largest banking group in ASEAN. It has thick Chinese 
heritage in banking that can be traced to the establishments of Bian Chiang Bank (BCB), Ban 
Hin Lee Bank (BHLB), and Southern Bank.  
CIMB also has a Malay root and tradition that can be traced to the establishment of 
Bank Bumiputera Malaysia Berhad (BBMB). BBMB has a ‘Chinese touch’. In its formative 
years, prominent Chinese businessmen, Robert Kuok and Khoo Kay Peng were appointed 
directors of BBMB in 1966 to assist the bank (Gomez, 1999: 102). CIMB’s early changed of 
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ownership and identity was when the Wee family who founded BCB sold their 36 per cent 
stake to UMNO-owned Fleet Group in 1975. Four years later (1979), the Fleet Group 
completed its acquisition of BCB and led to the formation of Bank of Commerce Bhd and 
retain the acronym band name of BCB (Gomez 1990: 36). By the 1980s, BBMB becomes the 
largest bank in the country in terms of assets and was the first Malaysian bank to have 
operations in New York, London, Tokyo, Bahrain and Hong Kong. 
In October 1999, BBMB recovered from the Asian financial crisis and other financial 
problems to merge with Bank of Commerce Behad, resulting in the formation of Bumiputra-
Commerce Bank (BCB), which was the biggest merger in Malaysia's banking history under 
the control of Commerce Asset Holdings Berhad (CAHB). In 2005, CAHB announced its 
decision to create a universal bank by combining its commercial and investment banks. On an 
aggressive M&A, in March 2006, CIMB launched a hostile takeover of Southern Bank, 
which was one of the ten anchor banks announced in 1999. Southern Bank is an enlarged 
Chinese-controlled bank with strong fundamental after it merged with Ban Hin Lee Bank in 
2001, in the post-Asian financial crisis banking consolidation process. CIMB Group 
recognized Southern Bank as an important player in wealth management products, credit 
cards and SME lending that are Chinese dominant. Southern Bank was the first in the country 
to set up the MEPS/ATM system used throughout Malaysia today. After enlarging its 
consumer banking sector, Bumiputra-Commerce Bank was rebranded to its current name, 
CIMB in 2006. The takeover of Southern Bank added a valued niche player in consumer 
banking to the Group. The merger combined the extensive resources and reach of Bumiputra-
Commerce Bank with the expertise and agility of Southern Bank. The CIMB chief felt that 
CIMB needed to proceed with the takeover of Southern Bank to compliment the banking 
franchise it was trying to build. It was a hostile takeover because Southern Bank has been an 
important ingredient to help effect the turnaround in CIMB’s consumer franchise (The Star 4 
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August 2012). From this merger, CIMB formed a regional universal banking group that aims 
to be ‘Southeast Asia’s Most Valued Universal Bank’ and embarked on a rebranding exercise 
and unveiled a new logo and a new tagline, ‘Forward Banking’, reflecting its promise to 
create value for customers through forward thinking. In other word, CIMB has created for 
itself a new identity in the ASEAN countries. 
In the context of increased liberalization of the banking sector, which size and 
efficiency matter led the leadership of the CIMB Group to position itself as an ASEAN bank 
by building its ASEAN franchise. It attempts to emulate the model of ‘too big to fail’ banks 
such as the Goldman Sachs and JP Morgan of the United States that have an international 
investment banking operations. CIMB’s expansion strategies are quite similar to that of 
Malayan Banking and RHB Bank. In 2004, CIMB forms 60:40 joint-venture with the 
Principal Financial Group of the United States, a NYSE-listed global financial service 
company and resulted in the formation of CIMB-Principal Asset Management Berhad 
(CIMB-Principal). CIMB-Principal has regional investment capabilities in Malaysia with 
regional footprint covering Singapore, Indonesia and Thailand. CIMB was on ‘shopping 
spree’ to expand its international investment banking operations. In 2005, it acquired GK 
Goh Securities Pte Ltd and led to the formation of CIMB-GK Securities Pte Ltd, which 
strengthening CIMB's international investment banking operations. GK Goh was founded in 
Singapore in 1979, evolving into a reputable pan-Asian stockbroking franchise with 
operations in Singapore, Indonesia, Hong Kong, the UK and the US.  
CIMB Group flexes its muscles during the 2008 global financial crisis when almost 
all Western banks of giant size were forced to sell their operations abroad. CIMB Group 
strengthening its present in Southeast Asia and connect itself to global financial centres and 
large economies that have linkages with ASEAN. To achieve this aim, CIMB Group acquired 
a 19.99% stake in the Bank of Yingkou in 2008, adding mainland China to the group’s 
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network. In the same year, CIMB Group created the sixth largest bank in Indonesia after the 
group merged PT Bank Niaga Tbk with PT Bank Lippo Tbk. The merged bank was 
rebranded as ‘CIMB Niaga’ in Indonesia. Also, in 2008 CIMB acquired a 93% stake in 
BankThai Pcl. That strengthening CIMB Group’s universal banking platform across major 
ASEAN markets and made the Group’s retail network the widest in ASEAN. BankThai was 
rebranded as ‘CIMB Thai’ and its new brand and logo were unveiled to the public in May 
2009 as part of CIMB Thai’s transformation into becoming a financial institution that offers 
innovative products and service to the Thai market. In September 2009, CIMB Group set up 
retail banking services in Singapore. The retail banking component complements CIMB 
Group’s existing securities, advisory and corporate lending businesses in Singapore. In 
November 2010, CIMB Group spreads its present in Cambodia. In April 2012, CIMB had 
purchased some of Royal Bank of Scotland’s (RBS) Asian investment banking business in 
the Asia Pacific for USD142 million. RBS’s operations in Asia Pacific markets include 
Australia, Hong Kong, Indonesia and Thailand. The acquisition aims to make CIMB 
becoming one of the top three Southeast Asian banks by assets and return on equity. In 
underwriting capital-market deals for the Asia- Pacific, data indicates that CIMB beat out 
DBS Group Holdings Ltd. and HSBC Holdings Plc, while RBS trailed at No. 35. Whilst for 
takeovers, it trumped Morgan Stanley, Credit Suisse Group AG and Goldman Sachs with 
RBS lagging behind at number 19 (Bloomberg 25 June 2012). 
The CIMB Group is emerging as a top regional financier for mergers and acquisitions. 
In late 2012, CIMB provided some of the financing to Overseas Union Enterprise Ltd' 
(UOE)’s S$9bil counterbid for Fraser and Neave Ltd.3 The deal marks CIMB Group as the 
top of the regional M&As league in South-East Asia for 2012. CIMB is also growing its 
cross-border M&A deals. For instance, it helped to broker a billion-dollar deal which saw 
private equity firm CVC Capital Partners buying 98 per cent of PT Matahari Department 
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Store, Indonesia's largest supermarket chain owned by the Lippo Group (The Star 20 
November 2012). CIMB also involved in the Songkhla-based Sri Trang Agro-Industry PCL 
and Malaysia Smelting Corp Bhd.'s listing on the Singapore Exchange, and Genting 
Singapore Plc (GENS)’s S$1.8 billion (USD1.4 billion) perpetual bond sale in 2012. It also 
assisted Saudi Arabia-based Islamic Development Bank in selling $800 million of Shariah-
compliant debt last week.  
As a state-owned bank, the lender is benefiting from Malaysian companies, especially 
state-owned companies that are pushing ahead with IPOs even as markets worldwide are 
affected by Europe’s protracted debt crisis. CIMB was principal adviser and managing 
underwriter for the Malaysian portion of IHH Healthcare Bhd.'s USD2.1bil dual listing on the 
Kuala Lumpur and Singapore stock exchanges in July 2012. It helped raise USD3.3 billion 
for Kuala Lumpur-based plantation owner Felda Global Ventures Holdings Bhd., Malaysia’s 
biggest in 2012 IPO after Facebook Inc.’s USD16 billion share sale. IHH Healthcare Bhd., a 
Malaysian-government controlled company is Asia’s largest hospital operator. Felda Global 
Ventures, also a Malaysian-government controlled company is the world's third largest oil 
palm plantation operator. 
While the CIMB Group is expanding rapidly, its bigger Southeast Asian rivals are 
also expanding at the same time through acquisitions, seeking to tap growth in the region’s 
fastest-growing emerging markets. CIMB follows the footprints of some large US banks into 
the regional markets. However, its three-way merger exercise to creates Malaysia’s largest 
bank in mid-2014 did not materialize. If the exercise was successful, domestically, the 
enlarged entity will closely interlace the interests of political and business elites in the 
banking sector. 
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RHB Bank Group 
The RHB Bank Group is the fourth largest financial group in Malaysia. RHB Bank has the 
thickest Chinese heritage in finance and banking compared to Maybank and CIMB. RHB 
Bank started in 1997 from a merger between two Chinese founded banks – Kwong Yik Bank 
and D&C Bank (Development and Commercial Bank). Kwong Yik Bank was Malaya’s first 
local bank and D&C Bank was founded by H.S. Lee in 1966. Lee was well known 
entrepreneur and the first Minister of Finance of Malaysia. D&C Bank became the 5th largest 
Malaysian bank by the late 1980s. In 1982, Maybank increased its share ownership of Kwong 
Yik Bank from 50.4 per cent to 51.4 per cent (Lee 1987: 328). In 1986 the Lee family 
surrendered the management of D&C Bank, following Lee’s death. In 1990, Abdul Rashid 
Hussain, a politically well-connected corporate figure bought a majority shareholding of 
D&C Bank from the Lee family. In 1996, Rashid Hussain acquired a controlling stake in 
Kwong Yik from Maybank. A year later, in 1997 Rashid merged Kwong Yik Bank and D&C 
Bank, and formed RHB Bank, making it the country's biggest ever banking merger at that 
time. RHB Bank Berhad turned out as the third largest integrated financial services group in 
Malaysia in 1997. RHB Banking Group recognized its founding year as in 1913, which was 
the founding year of Kwong Yik Bank (Selangor). The group celebrated RHB Bank’s 100th 
anniversary in 2013. Internally, the group has built a diverse and performance-centric culture 
in its workplace.  
RHB Bank can be traced to another Chinese founded bank, the United Malayan 
Banking Corporation (UMBC). As of 1976, UMBC was Malaysia’s third largest bank, ranks 
after Maybank and Bank Bumiputera. UMBC was the first commercial bank established in 
independent Malaya in 1960 by a group of businessmen, led by Chang Ming Thien, a 
prominent figure in the rubber industry in Malaya and Singapore. Pernas (National 
Corporation), a wholly owned government company, through its growth strategies to 
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indegenize key economic sectors in the country seized the opportunity to obtain control of 
UMBC when it suffered the fate encountered by Malayan Banking in 1966. UMBC ran into 
financial problem in 1976 and led to government intervention due to suspected frauds by the 
directors who issued loans to companies owned by themselves. The susequent restructuring 
of the bank gave even more opportunity for Bumiputera to have bigger share ownership in 
UMBC. In May 1985 the then Finance Minister, Daim Zainuddin acquired outright control of 
UMBC and then sold it to Pernas with a lucrative profit in 1986. As of early 1990s, Pernas 
hold a 85.7 per cent stake in UMBC and suffered massive loans taken to acquire the bank. 
Following this and the poor returns on this investment forced Pernas to sell UMBC in 1992 to 
Datuk Keramat Holdings, a Bumiputera company that was without previous banking 
experience. After that the bank was involved in several financial impropriety, including the 
disbursement of questionable loans. Sime Darby, a Public listed, but state-controlled 
conglomerate bought UMBC in 1996 (Searl 1999: 74; Gomez and Jomo 1999: 33-34, 56-59, 
193-194). Sime Bank declared a loss of RM1.8 billion during the 1997-98 Asian financial 
crisis. The troubled Sime Bank was then absorbed by RHB Bank in 1999. The processes of 
M&A in RHB bank since its incorporation until the acquisition of Sime Bank indicate the 
preference of the state and power of individual Bumiputera such as Abdul Rashid Hussain 
that had gained control of a major slice of Malaysia’s financial sector within a short period. 
The post-Asian financial crisis bank consolidation led to the merger of Utama Banking Group 
(UBG) into the RHB Banking Group. This M&A involved tough negotiations with RHB 
founder Rashid Hussain sold his entire 23.9 per cent stake to UBG in 2003. Under the UBG 
group management, RHB went through a volatile period to deal with the group’s debt 
restructuring plans, and it was without top management leadership (The Edge Malaysia 16 
November 2009). 
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Since year 2007 RHB Baking Group is control by Malaysia’s employee provident 
fund (EPF). The restructured banking group is ambitious to be ASEAN’s third largest bank 
by 2020. RHB Bank Group also has a regional expansion plan like Maybank and CIMB that 
had just made their big foray into Indonesia during the 2008 global financial crisis. In 2008 
RHB Investment acquired a 49 per cent stake in Vietnam Securities Corp. RHB chose to be 
more cautious of not spending too much. Its strategy was to acquire mid-sized bank such as 
PT Bank Mestika Dharma in Indonesia in 2009. However, it failed to get approval from the 
Financial Services Authority of Indonesia. 
Just like Maybank and CIMB, the increased competition in the domestic market and 
the intensification of globalization of the financial sector has pushed RHB Banking Group to 
take an inorganic approach to expand its investment banking in the fast growing Southeast 
Asian economies by acquiring OSK Holdings Bhd. (OSK), a stockbroking company, in 2012. 
This acquisition gives an instant boost to RHB’s investment banking operations in Southeast 
Asian markets such as Malaysia, Indonesia, Thailand, Singapore, Cambodia, Hong Kong and 
China. This strategy enables the RHB Group to capture a surge in mergers and stock deals in 
Southeast Asia. This enlarge merged entity increases its ability to compete in Asia with 
global players such as Goldman Sachs and Morgan Stanley. RHB had grown in size and is 
ranked seventh in Southeast Asia for underwriting domestic bonds, and 18th for share sales 
(Bloomberg 30 April 2013). 
 
The Remnant of Chinese-controlled Banks in Malaysia 
Among other measures, the increased capital requirements by the central bank effectively 
reduced the number of Chinese-owned banks to just two, namely Public Bank Berhad (PBB) 
and Hong Leong Bank Berhad (HLBB). As state-owned banks grew in size and expanded in 
the region, the remaining two Chinese-controlled banks in Malaysia are also expanding to 
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avoid being target of acquisition as Malaysia’s banking policies clearly favoured state-owned 
banks and Bumiputera interests. Under the protracted affirmative action policy, PBB and 
HLBB have been able to gain government’s favour through well-connected political figures 
and achieved substantial growth. However, the founders and Chinese-ownership in these two 
banks have declined over years but are still retaining the management control.  
 
Public Bank Group 
The Public Bank Group is the third largest banking group in Malaysia by asset size 
(RM305.73 billion as at end of 2013). During the NEP period, Public Bank pursued a 
Bumiputera policy in the bank. Public Bank was the first Malaysian local bank to have a 
Malay Chairman – Tan Sri Nik Ahmed Kamil, an influential member of United Malay 
National Organization (UMNO) ruling party (Bowie 2006: 78: Tan 1982: 282). Most non-
Bumiputeras regarded the NEP as a disincentive but the founder of Public Bank Berhad 
(PBB), Teh Hong Peow, recognized its’ potential. Public Bank was accordingly granted 
‘Approved Status’ by the Finance Minister for meeting all of the Central Bank’s priority 
lending guideline and for fulfilling the NEP’s Bumiputera ownership and employment 
quotas. The ‘Approved Status’ also enables PBB to accept government deposits (Gomez 
1999: 39; Bowie 2006: 107). As early as 1980, it attained the prescribed goal, reaching a 
31.2% equity stake in the bank and constant with the national agenda (Bowie 2006: 210). By 
abiding to the affirmative action policy, PBB was given licences. By 1990 the bank has 90 
bank branches and 78 finance company branches (Bowie 2006: 211, 214, 215).   
PBB, a well-managed bank survived the ten critical anchor bank consolidation of the 
domestic banking system in post 1997/98 Asian financial crisis. It was the least affected 
among other local banks by the Asian financial crisis and emerged relatively unscathed. 
Under the ten anchor bank consolidation directive, PBB acquired Hock Hua Bank in 2001. 
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Public Bank also acquired Sime Merchant Bank in 2000 (Bowie 2006: 218, 266). Today, 
PBB is the largest non-Governmental linked bank, and the fourth largest (after Malayan 
Banking, Sime Darby and Tenaga National) company listed on the KLSE in terms of market 
capitalization. The Public Bank Group has two listed entities on the KLSE, namely Public 
Bank Berhad and Loanpac Insurance Bhd. 
Since the 1990s PBB is already a regional bank. On January 1990, PBB made a 
significant move to acquire Public Finance Limited, Hong Kong (formerly known as JCG 
Finance Company Limited) as the banks’ first overseas subsidiary. Since early 1992, PBB 
entered Sri Lanka and Vietnam. Later in mid-1992 it opened a branch in Cambodia.  In late 
1992 it became Malaysia’s first bank to open a branch each in Myanmar and Laos. In June 
2006 PBB made another milestone to strengthen its regional ambition after it acquired Hong 
Kong’s Asia Commercial Bank (ABC) for HK4.5 billion in June 2006. ABC was renamed as 
Public bank (Hong Kong) Limited that has 32 branches with a branch in Shenzhen and 
representative offices in Shanghai and Shenyang, China. At the domestic front, in 1993 PBB 
acquired KL Mutual Fund Berhad and renamed it Public Mutual. In July 2006 Public Mutual 
became a 100 percent-owned subsidiary of PBB. As of 2011, the PBB expanded its regional 
network to 120 with 83 branches in Hong Kong, 3 branches in China, 23 branches in 
Cambodia, 7 branches in Vietnam, 3 branches in Laos, a branch in Sri Lanka and 3 
representative offices in Shanghai, Shenyang, and Taipei. 
The founder’s ownership of the bank’s equity had dropped from 48 per cent to 40 per 
cent during 1983-1989, while the Bumiputera share also decreased from 31.5 per cent to 25.9 
per cent. Conversely, in the context of the state’s relaxation of foreign participation in the 
domestic financial sector, foreign shareholdings in the bank rapidly increased from 18.5 per 
cent to 29.8 per cent (Hara 1991: 354). As of end 2013, the founder’s total ownership in the 
bank was further decreased to 24.08 per cent (Public Bank Annual Report 2013: 206).   
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The pro-state and Bumiputera bank policies, and coupled with potential external 
shocks led PBB to propose a RM5 billion rights issue, the largest by a local financial 
institution in recent years. This quantum cash call in May 2014 surprised the market. Even 
more surprising is that the founder and chairman, subscribed his entitlement in full. The size 
of the fund-raising indicates that the bank is fortifying its capital base beyond its requirement. 
It raises question on why would the 84-year-old banker commit approximately RM1.2bil of 
his money to fortify the bank, which has been left to professional managers. According to the 
value of the bank, analysts calculated that a RM1.2bil capital infusion by the founder will 
immediately triple its value to RM4bil. The total amount raised has far existed the capital 
requirements under Basel III and the central bank’s requirement, which means that the bank 
is over-capitalized. Some bankers and analysts reason that the founder wants to ensure that he 
leaves behind Public Bank as his legacy and that the bank need to be over-capitalized to 
overcome future economic downturn or certain regulatory requirements. The rights issue is 
aimed at strengthening Public Bank’s capital base, in light of the implementation of the 
Internal Capital Adequacy Assessment Process, or ICAAP, and additional capital ratios 
imposed by the central bank (The Star 3 May 2014) and to avoid any eventualities to be 
controlled by the central bank in the future.  
 
Hong Leong Bank Group 
The Hong Leong Bank Group is Malaysia’s fifth largest banking group with RM170.4 billion 
in total assets which has sales and business centres in Malaysia, Singapore, Hong Kong, 
Vietnam, Cambodia and China. Hong Leong Bank Berhad (HLBB) has more than a century 
of heritage in the mortgage and remittance industry since 1905 in Kuching, Sarawak, under 
the name of Kwong Lee Mortgage and Remittance Company. It was incorporated as Kwong 
Lee Bank Ltd in 1934. The Lim family who founded the bank maintained their ownership 
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and management until 1982 when the bank was acquired by a Chinese tycoon, Khoo Kay 
Peng of the MUI Industry Group in Kuala Lumpur. The bank was renamed Malayan United 
Bank Berhad in 1983. Subsequently it was renamed MUI Bank Bhd. The Chairman of the 
bank in the early 1980s was Tunku Osman Tuanku Temenggong Ahmad, a member of the 
Johore royal family. Due to political reason to grovel himself with UMNO leaders, Khoo 
realize that he would not be able to expand the bank’s operations with increased regulation of 
the sector. Khoo divested his entire stake in MUI Bank in 1993 to Quek Leng Chan of the 
Hong Leong Group in Malaysia that has been in the financial services industry since 1968 
through Hong Leong Finance Berhad (Gomez 1999: 78, 82, 103, 106, 108). The Hong Leong 
Group’s acquisition of MUI Bank reveal Quek’s close link with Anwar Ibrahim, the then 
Finance Ministry that exempted the takeover “… from complying with Malaysia’s banking 
rules which limit the shareholdings of any individual corporate shareholder of a bank to no 
more than 20 per cent” (Gomez 1999: 155-156). MUI Bank was rename Hong Leong Bank 
Berhad in October 1994.  
The post-Asian financial crisis’ state-led ten anchor bank consolidation ended Wah 
Tat Bank’s operation after it became part of Hong Leong Bank in 2001. Another Chinese-
owned bank, Kong Ming Bank founded by the late Ling Beng Sung in Sarawak in 1965, had 
become part of HLBB after the group acquired EON Bank in 2011. Kong Ming Bank was 
sold to Edaran Otomobil Nasional (EON), national Proton car distributor in 1992 which 
marked the birth of EON Bank Berhad (The Edge Malaysia 11 January 2010). The 
acquisition of EON Bank transforms HLBB into a banking group of more than RM170 
billion in assets as of December 2013.  
The Hong Leong group expended its acquisition abroad by acquiring two Hong Kong 
banks, the Dao Heng Bank in 1987 and merged with Hang Lung Bank in 1989. In 1992, the 
group bought another Hong Kong bank, the Overseas Trust Bank. The group also acquired 
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the Benchmark Bank Plc and renaming it Dao Heng Bank (London) plc. The group sold off 
its shares in Dao Heng Bank to Singapore’s DBS Bank for RM10 billion (Gomez 1999: 154). 
HLBB’s regional expansion continues as it bought a 19.99 per cent (RM877.5 million) stake 
in a small-sized commercial bank based in Chengdu, China in 2007 (The Star 26 October 
2007). In the same year, HLBB entered the Vietnam market with a wholly-owned 
commercial bank operation. In 2013, it began its wholly-owned commercial bank in 
Cambodia.  
 
Conclusion 
The protracted affirmative action policy and the increased globalization of the financial sector 
had led to the state protectionism of local banks in Malaysia that favoured state-owned banks 
and Bumiputera interests. At the same time these two forces had also led to several rounds of 
banking consolidations and transformation of the Malaysian banks ownership and identities. 
Many Chinese or family-owned banks had been acquired by state-owned banks and 
Bumiputera interests. The numbers of local banks have been reduced, and small and medium-
size domestic banks had grown to become large-scale and regional banking groups that 
spread their present in East and Southeast Asia.  
In the context of ASEAN, a ‘multi-local model’ has been explored to retain some of 
the indigenous properties. Cross border acquisitions with new branding create new identities 
for Malaysia’s local banks in an increased connected market activities in the region. The 
globalization of the financial sector is shaping the identity of Malaysia’s small and medium 
local banks to large, and to certain extent, becoming ‘too big to fail’ state-owned universal 
banks with competitive innovation in product development, more broad based business 
activities, ability to clinch big financial deals, increased capital base, and establishing a 
regional brand. The 2008 protracted global financial crisis creates a global economic power 
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shifts to the region which prompted three of Malaysia’s largest state-owned banks seize 
opportunities to capture strategic and valuable deals while some European banks were 
withdrawing their business operations in the region. This shows the power of the state, in the 
case of Malaysia, the state is resilient to the pressure of globalization of the financial sector. 
All three state-controlled banks, Maybank, CIMB Bank and RHB Bank as discussed 
in this article adopt similar strategies that acquired strategic stockbroking companies, be it 
local or foreign companies to expedite their regional present in investment banking in 
ASEAN and beyond. However, Chinese-owned banks are very careful with their expansion 
plan because they can’t afford to make any mistakes that may lead to any eventualities of 
being controlled by the central bank.  
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 The prominent Wee family who founded Bian Chiang Bank is founding member of the United Overseas Bank 
(UOB) in Singapore in 1971. 
2
 OCBC was established in 1919 by Chinese Singaporean businessmen in Singapore to facilitate the growing 
financial needs of the local Chinese community. 
3 OUE made the S$9.08 per share offer, which works out to S$13.1bil for F&N, countering the S$8.88 (S$9bil) 
a share made by Thai billionaire Charoen Sirivadhanabhakdi of the Pokphand Charoen group who has interests 
in the food and agribusiness, retail and distribution as well as telecommunication industries. 
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